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TRINKO: A KINDER, GENTLER APPROACH TO
DOMINANT FIRMS UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS?
Edward D. Cavanagh·

I. INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Sherman Act 1 prohibits monopolization, attempted monopolization and conspiracy to monopolize. 2 The § 2 prohibitions are rooted in concerns "that
possession ofunchallenged economic power deadens initiative, discourages thrift and
depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a ·
stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to
counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone." 3 At the same time,
courts have recognized that size alone cannot be the basis of condemnation under§ 2,4
for as Learned Hand observed in Alcoa,5 "[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins.''6 Reconciling the
conflicting currents of§ 2-preventing abusive practices by dominant firms without,
at the same time, chilling the competitive vigor of dominant firms-has proven to be
a difficult task for the courts because "it is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-run anticompetitive effects.'' 7
Early monopolization cases found violations based on predatory acts, 8 exclusionary conduct,9 or refusals to deal. 10 However, the decisions in these cases were more
the product of each court's visceral reaction to the cases in question rather than the end

• Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
I. 15 u.s.c.§ 2 (2000).
2. Id.
3. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. (Alcoa), 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 1945).
4. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. I, 62 (191 I) (Section 2 does not prohibit
monopoly "in the concrete"); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 273 (2d Cir. 1979)
("Section 2 does not prohibit monopoly simplicitier.").
5. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 430.
6. Id.
7. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 767-68 (I 984); See, e.g., Spectrum
Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 44 7, 458-59 ( 1993). Similarly in Spectrum Sports, the Supreme Court
noted
[T]his Court and other courts have been careful to avoid constructions of§ 2 which might
chill competition, rather than foster it. It is sometimes difficult to distinguish robust
competition from conduct with long-term anticompetitive effects; moreover, single-firm
activity is unlike concerted activity covered by § I, which "inherently is fraught with
anticompetitive risk."
Id. (citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 767-69).
8. See, e.g., Standard Oil, 221 U.S. at I.
9. See, e.g., Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 416.
10. See, e.g., Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
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result of hard legal analysis of§ 2 and thus provided insufficient guidance for later
cases. 11
Subsequently, courts moved to a more conduct-specific standard in analyzing
monopolization cases. This conduct-specific standard is perhaps best exemplified by
the Supreme Court's ruling in Grinne/112 that in order to prove monopolization,
plaintiff must show (1) that defendant possessed monopoly power, i.e., the power to
control price or to exclude competition; and (2) ''willful acquisition or maintenance of
[monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of
a superior product, business acumen, or historic accident." 13 Simply put, the offense
of monopolization is made out by proof of defendant's size plus its bad acts. Under
Grinnell, "bad acts" include predatory pricing, 14 leveraging, 15 and refusals to share an
essential facility. 16 While a step forward analytically, the conduct-specific approach
does not address all types of conduct that might violate § 2. Particularly troublesome
for the courts has been conduct by dominant firms that excludes rivals. While a
consensus has emerged in cases involving exclusionary pricing practices by dominant
firms, 17 the law with respect to non-price exclusionary behavior by dominant firms
remains very much up in the air; and the question of when a dominant firm may
lawfully refuse to deal with rivals and thereby exclude them from the field is "one of
the most uncertain areas in all of U.S. antitrust law." 18 Such uncertainty has led lower

11. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263,273 (2d Cir. 1979) (noting that, in trying
to reconcile "the crosscurrents and pulls and tugs of§ 2," the "cryptic" opinion in Alcoa created "a litigant's
wishing well, into which, it sometimes seems, one may peer and find nearly anything he wishes").
12. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
13. Id. at570-71.
14. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-24 (1993)
(explaining that to establish predatory pricing, plaintiff must prove that defendant sold at prices "below an
appropriate measure" of defendant's cost and that the defendant had a "dangerous probability[] of
recouping its investment in below cost prices").
15. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. JOO,108 (1948) (describing that the use of monopoly power in
theaters in one city to obtain exclusive motion picture distribution rights in cities where competition existed,
amounted to illegal monopolization).
16. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985) (holding that rival's
withdrawal from a long and profitable joint marketing arrangement to the detriment of its former partner
without business justification constitutes a violation of§ 2).
17. Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 222-24.
18. Robert Pitofsky, Past, Present and Future Antitrust Enforcement at the Federal Trade
Commission, 72 U. CHI. L. REV.209,217 (2005). Additionally, Robert Pitofsky stated:
I wrote recently that questions concerning the nature of the behavior by a monopolist that
violates Section 2 "is one of the most uncertain areas of antitrust." I add that the uncertainty
is costly to sellers and consumers. Sellers may be unduly timid in selecting competitive
strategies because they don't know where the line is describing permissible conduct; as a
result, consumers may be denied efficiencies or other benefits they would enjoy if the
antitrust laws were more certain.
I assume at the core antitrust would declare illegal conduct by a monopolist that is
unreasonably exclusionary. . . . Some issues are easy to decide. For example, cases that
involve lowering prices above some standard of cost, improving products, investing in
innovation are all in the safe harbor usually entitled "superior skill[,] foresight and
industry." On the other hand, behavior by a monopolist that violates some other provision
of the antirust laws, such as procuring a patent by fraud on the Patent Office, or selling at
what eventually is recognized as "below cost," are almost always indefensible.
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courts most recently to try to develop a "one size fits all" test for exclusionary
conduct. 19 Against this background, the Supreme Court entertained the Trinko20 case.
The Court in Trinka held that Verizon was not liable under the antitrust laws to a
customer of rival AT&T for its failure to provide AT&T prompt access to the Verizon
local phone network, which the plaintiff alleged caused it to experience inferior local
phone service. 21 In so holding, the Court declined to embrace any bright-line rules
addressing monopolistic refusals to deal but spent considerable energy making the case
for a more tolerant approach to dominant firms. This article will explore the impact
of the Trinka decision on the lower courts. Courts at both the trial and intermediate
appellate levels have been cautious in their responses to Trinka. Unquestionably, the
lower courts even after Trinka remain suspicious of exclusionary behavior by dominant
firms and continue their search for a principled basis upon which to distinguish lawful
from unlawful exclusionary behavior by dominant firms. Accordingly, Trinka does not
mark an abrupt departure from the doctrine of prior cases but rather underscores the
lack of clarity on the issue of when non-price exclusionary behavior by a monopolist
is unlawful under § 2.
II. TRINKO

A. The Decision
In Trinka, a unanimous Supreme Court reversed a Second Circuit decision holding
that a breach of obligations imposed by the Telecommunications Act of 199622 by
defendant telephone company did not ipso facto give rise to a monopolization claim
under § 2 of the Sherman Act23 on behalf of a local telephone service customer of
defendant's rival. 24 The Court found that the Telecommunications Act does not create
any additional antitrust liability but merely preserves pre-existing antitrust standards. 25
Finally, the Court ruled that the case does not fit within the small category of cases that
constitute an exception to the general rule that there is no duty to aid rivals, 26 nor does

Refusal to deal cases fall in the vast gray area between those clear cases and are
therefore very difficult to decide. On the one hand, it is settled law that a seller can pick and
choose among its customers (at least where its purpose is not to achieve or maintain a
monopoly) and has no obligation to offer affirmative assistance to prospective rivals. On
the other hand, an abrupt discontinuance of prior dealings with the purpose and effect of
injuring the competitive process has been found (correctly, I believe) to be an antitrust
violation unless there are significant business justifications.
Robert Pitofsky, Standards For Exclusionary Behavior Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, Comments
to the Antitrust Modernization Commission, September 29, 2005, www.arnc.gov/commission_
hearings/pdf/Pitofsky.pdf [hereinafter Pitofsky Testimony] (footnotes omitted).
I 9. The so-called "profit sacrifice test" encompasses this approach. See infra notes I 06-113 and
accompanying text.
20. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
21. Id. at 407-16.
22. 47 U.S.C. § 25 l(c) (2000).
23. 15 u.s.c.§ 2 (2000).
24. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407; Greco v. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc., 2005 WL 659200, at •3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
Mar. 22, 2005).
25. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407.
26. Id. at 409-11.
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it call for a new exception to the Sherman Act requiring a monopolist to deal with a
rival. 27
Defendant Verizon is a successor to one of the regional operating companies
created by the break-up of AT&T in 1982. Prior to enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Verizon enjoyed an exclusive franchise in its local telephone service
area. 28 The Telecommunications Act sought to spur competition in local service and
required incumbent local service providers, such as Verizon, to share its local network
with competitors. 29 Verizon agreed to provide rival AT&T with access to its
network. 30 In 1999, AT&T and other rivals ofVerizon complained to state and federal
regulators that many orders were going unfilled in violation ofVerizon's obligations
to provide access to its local service network. 31 Thereafter, Verizon was found by both
the New York Public Service Commission (PSC) and the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) to have breached its obligations under the 1996 Act to AT&T. 32
Verizon was assessed significant fines by the PSC and the FCC. 33 Following the FCC
action, plaintiff, a New York City law firm and AT&T local service customer,
commenced a monopolization action under § 2 of the Sherman Act, claiming that
Verizon's breach of its agreement with AT&T had caused poor service to AT&T
customers and had discouraged Verizon customers from becoming customers ofrival
local service providers. 34
The trial court dismissed the complaint, but the Second Circuit reversed,
reinstating the claim in part, including the antitrust claim. 35 The Supreme Court
reversed and remanded. 36 In so holding, the High Court posed and analyzed four
questions: (1) Does the Telecommunications Act of 1996 create additional antitrust
liability? (2) Does the conduct in question violate traditional antitrust standards? (3)
Does the conduct fit within the exception established in Aspen Skiing? (4) Should a
new exception be created? 37

1. Telecommunications Act of 1996
The Court ruled that the Telecommunications Act did not create additional
antitrust burdens for telephone companies. 38 Rather, the Act merely preserves those
claims that satisfy established antitrust standards. 39 The Act's preservation clause in
tum would preclude any defense by Verizon of implied antitrust immunity based on
the 1996 Act. 40

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 411.
Id. at 402.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 403-04.
Id. at 404.
Id.
Id. at 405.
Id at 416.
See id. at 401-16.
Id. at 406-07.
Id. at 407.
Id.
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2. Traditional Antitrust Standards
The Court summarized the law of monopolization, emphasizing that possession
of monopoly power itself is not unlawful; only when monopoly power is accompanied
by anticompetitive conduct will an antitrust violation occur. 41 The Court underscored
the long-recognized right of traders to select those with whom they will deal. 42 It
further observed that a monopolist ordinarily may reap the fruits of its labor, noting
that "( t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces
innovation and economic growth.''4 3 To protect these incentives to innovate, courts
will not condemn possession of monopoly power ''unless it is accompanied by an
element of anticompetitive conduct. •'44
The Court also pointed out that firms may acquire monopoly power by creating
an infrastructure that "renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers," hinting
that this was precisely what Verizon had done. 45 Forced sharing of such infrastructures
would, according to the Court, run counter to basic antitrust principles. First, requiring
a monopolist to share those fruits may chill innovation and may cast judges as central
planners-roles for which the courts are ill-suited. 46 Second, forced access would
compel rivals to negotiate and thereby create the risk of collusive behavior. 47 Third,
forced sharing would undermine the long-recognized right of a trader to choose its own
customers. 48 The Court concluded that Verizon' s refusal to share its infrastructure with
AT&T could not give rise to liability for monopolization under traditional standards.

3. Aspen Skiing
At the same time, the Court recognized that a trader's "right to refuse to deal with
other firms is not unqualified.''4 9 In Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing
Corp., 50 the Court had previously held that a monopolist's withdrawal from a longstanding and profitable joint marketing arrangement was unlawfully exclusionary,
where the withdrawal brought about an important change in the market and where the
monopolist offered no valid business justification for its conduct. st In Trinko, the
Court concluded that Aspen Skiing was inapposite. 52 The Court first stated that the
Aspen Skiing exception has been applied cautiously "because of the uncertain virtue
of forced sharing and the difficulty of identifying and remedying anticompetitive
conduct by a single firm." 53 The Court then distinguished Aspen Skiing, which it

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
41.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id.
Id. at 408 (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919)).
Id. at 407.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 408.
Id.
Id. (citing United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300,307 (1919)).
Id. (quoting Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,601 (1985)).
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
Id. at 601.
Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-10.
Id. at 408.
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described as "at or near the outer boundary of§ 2 liability." 54 It pointed out that Aspen
Skiing involved an ongoing and presumably profitable venture unilaterally terminated
by the defendant. 55 The Court stated that defendant's conduct there "suggested a
willingness to forsake short-term profits to achieve an anticompetitive end. " 56 Equally
important, defendant's refusal to renew the venture, ~ven if compensated at retail
levels, "revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent." 57
The Court found that the facts here did not fit within the Aspen Skiing rationale. 58
Unlike the defendant in Aspen Skiing, Verizon did not have an ongoing relationship
with AT&T prior to the passage of the Telecommunications Act. 59 Accordingly, prior
conduct "sheds no light" on Verizon's motivation not to deal and creates no inference
of anticompetitive malice.60 More importantly, pricing behavior was different: in
Aspen Skiing, defendant declined compensation at retail levels, from which one could
infer monopolistic intent; Verizon's compensation was cost-based, which reveals
nothing ofVerizon's motivations. 61 The Court further distinguished Aspen Skiing by
pointing out that in that case the services withheld had previously been available to the
public, whereas the Verizon services withheld were not available to the public. 62
Accordingly, Aspen Skiing did not govern. 63
In so ruling, the Court called into question the essential facilities doctrine
recognized by lower courts. 64 Without passing on the merits of the essential facilities
doctrine, the Court concluded that it would not be applicable on these facts because the
Telecommunications Act mandated Verizon to give rivals access to its facilities. 65

4. New Exceptions
The Court concluded that the facts of this case do not call for a new exception to
the rule that a monopolist has no duty to aid rivals. 66 The Court observed that the
extensive regulatory network in place in telecommunications "diminishes the likelihood of major antitrust harm. "67 Moreover, any marginal benefit derived from antitrust
intervention would be outweighed by the cost of enforcement. 68 In particular, the
Court pointed out that the application of§ 2 requirements is difficult, and the potential
means of illegal exclusion are myriad. 69 The Court also pointed to the high cost of

54. Id. at 409.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 410; cf Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366,378 (1973) (finding defendant
liable for monopolistic refusal to deal had provided other customers the services that plaintiff sought).
63. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 4 JO.
64. Id. at 410-1 I.
65. Id. at 41 I.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 412 (citing Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990)).
68. Id. at 414.
69. Id. at 414 (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001)).
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error if the antitrust laws are mistakenly applied. 70 The Court noted the difficulties of
assessing the duties imposed by the Telecommunications Act and the potential for
"interminable litigation" was antitrust used as a weapon. 71 Finally, the Court found that
having antitrust courts policing conduct under the Telecommunications Act would
create intolerable administrative burdens and transform antitrust courts into regulatory
agencies. 72 While the Sherman Act is the '" Magna Carta of free enterprise, "' 73 the Act
"does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its way of doing
business wherever some other approach might yield greatercompetition." 74
B. Analysis

The Trinko decision is intriguing in several respects. First, the Court made
sweeping pronouncements on the law of monopolization on a very truncated record.
The Court also delved into the merits without even addressing the threshold standing
issue. Second, the Court might have simply held that violations of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 do not create additional antitrust obligations and limited its analysis
to the precise factual context in which the case arose. Instead, the Court enunciated
broader principles seemingly applicable to all § 2 cases, and not simply those involving
the highly regulated telecommunications arena. Third, having chosen to delve into the
merits of an alleged non-price based monopolistic refusal to deal, the Court declined
to adopt a bright-line rule delineating lawful and unlawful conduct. 75

1. Procedural Posture
Trinko came to the Court on Verizon's preanswer motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 76 In such cases, federal courts must
assume the facts alleged in the complaint are true and may not dismiss ''unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim
which would entitle him to relief. " 77 The focus, then, is on the adequacy of the
complaint and not on any fact-based defenses that a defendant might raise.
Yet the Court did not even pay lip service to the standards it has established in
adjudicating motions to dismiss. Not only did the Court fail to assume the truth of the
allegations of the complaint, it went further, prying out and piecing together from the
appellate briefs and prior administrative hearings-there was no answer to reference--

70. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 414.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 415.
73. Id. (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc. 405 U.S. 596,610 (1972)).
74. Id. at 415-16.
75. See Eleanor M. Fox, ls There Life in Aspen AflerTrinko: The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the
L.J. I 53, 162 ("Nowhere does [the Trinko Court] canvas the range of theories
Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST
that could and should support a Section 2 violation and nowhere does it reason that a violation may be
found only in cases involving profit sacrifice.").
76. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405.
77. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). As the late Professor Charles Alan Wright wrote,
"[t]his rule, which has been stated literally thousands of times, precludes final dismissal for insufficiency
of the complaint except in the extraordinary case in which the pleader makes allegations that show on the
face of the complaint some insuperable bar to relief." CHARLESALANWRIGHTANDMARYKAYKANE,LAw
OF FEDERALCOURTS§ 68(4) (6th ed. 2002).
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a "factual record" supporting Verizon's motion to dismiss. Among the Court's
"findings" were: ( 1) Verizon had created a valuable infrastructure, 78 (2) the unbundled
elements to which access is mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 "exist
only deep within the bowels ofVerizon," 79 (3) access could be offered by Verizon only
"at considerable expense and effort," 80 and (4) new systems must be "implemented
simply to make that access possible." 81
From the "findings" the Court concluded that the benefits of antitrust intervention
would be outweighed by the risk of false positives and by the costs that such intervention would impose on the judicial system. 82 For example, the Court found that
Verizon's failure to provide prompt interconnect services might have nothing to do
with exclusion. 83 The Court observed that violations of duties under the Telecommunications Act "are difficult for antitrust courts to evaluate, not only because they are
highly technical, but also because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the
incessant, complex, and constantly changing interactions of competitive and incumbent
LECs implementing the sharing and interconnection obligations." 84 The Court also
concluded that identifying anticompetitive acts would be "a daunting task for a
generalist antitrust court" and that oversight of obligations created by the 1996 Act
''would seem destined to distort investment and lead to a new layer of interminable
litigation." 85 Closely related to the foregoing conclusion was the Court's concern that
forced sharing would create duties to deal that could not be adequately supervised by
a district court and that threatened to tum the federal courts into a regulatory agency. 86
At the end of the day, the Trinko Court may very well be proven correct. The
disposition of this case on the record properly before the Court, however, was clearly
premature and at odds with the well-established legal standards for adjudicating
motions to dismiss. Equally troublesome was the Court's rush to address the merits
when, as Justice Stevens notes in his concurrence, serious questions of standing exist. 87
AT&T was clearly the target ofVerizon's allegedly exclusionary behavior. Plaintiff
Trinko may well have been injured in its "business or property" within the meaning of
section 4 of the Clayton Act, 88 but the courts have long recognized that the antitrust
laws cannot compensate for every "ripple of injury" caused by an antitrust violation. 89
In particular, courts will not entertain plaintiffs whose claims are derivative or
consequential. 90 As Justice Stevens wrote: Trinko lacks standing since "it remains the
case that whatever antitrust injury respondent suffered because ofVerizon's conduct

78. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 407.
79. Id. at 410.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 414.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 415.
87. Id. at 416 (Stevens, J., concurring).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a)(2000).
89. Blue Shield of Va. v. Mccready, 457 U.S. 465, 476-77 (1982); accord Andrx Pharm., Inc. v.
Biovail Corp. Int'I, 256 F.3d 799,806 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
90. See e.g., Associated Gen. Contractorv. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 53334 (1983).

HeinOnline -- 59 Me. L. Rev. 119 2007

120

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:l

was purely derivative of the injury that AT&T suffered." 91 Given that Trinko's injury
was purely derivative, permitting the claim to go forward raises significant risks of
92
duplicative recovery and the danger of complex apportionment of damages.
Accordingly, the Court could have, and should have, disposed of this case on standing
grounds.
2. Telecommunications or Antitrust?
Trinka can be read in at least two ways. One way is to view Trinka narrowly as
a case decided in the context of a heavily regulated telecommunications industry where
access to rivals' facilities is mandated by statute. Under the narrow view, Trinka
stands for the proposition that violations of the Telecommunications Act do not
93
themselves create separate claims for relief under the antitrust laws. Nor should a
dominant firm's refusals to deal be condemned under traditional antirust principles
where, as in the case of telecommunications, the industry has a heavy regulatory
overlay that includes mandated access to rival's facilities, particularly where the
regulatory authorities have already sanctioned the dominant firm for the conduct in
question. 94
A second, broader view is that Trinka applies to all § 2 cases. That view suggests
a more tolerant approach to monopolists so as to avoid false condemnation of behavior
that is efficiency-enhancing and promotes innovation and economic growth. This
second approach, which links monopoly with innovation and economic growth, would
be a radical restatement of§ 2 principles. Specifically, this broader approach would
tum traditional§ 2 analysis upside down by focusing the attention of the courts initially
on the benefits of exclusionary behaviors (efficiencies) instead of starting the analysis
with the exclusionary aspects (anticompetitive effects) of the dominant firm's behavior.
3. What is "Exclusionary Behavior?"

Whether its decision is read narrowly or broadly, the Court in Trinka shed little
light on when a monopolist's refusal to deal constitutes a violation of § 2. That
question continues to generate debate among antitrust scholars 95 and confusion in the
courts. 96 Part of that debate has been resolved by the Supreme Court. Where a
monopolist uses price as a weapon to exclude, there is a general consensus that the

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 417 (Stevens, J., concurring).
Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 543-44.
See Greco v. Verizon Cornmc'ns, Inc., 2005 WL 659200, at •3 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 22, 2005).
See id.
See Einer Elhauge, Defining Better Monopolization Standards, 56 STAN.L. REV.253, 267-70
Andrew I. Gavil, Exclusionary Distribution Strategies by Dominant Firms: Striking a Better
Balance, 72 ANTITRUSTL.J. 3, 3-5 (2004); Herbert Hovenkamp, Exclusion and the Sherman Act, 72 U.
CHI. L. REV. 147, 151-62 (2005); Mark R. Patterson, The Sacrifice of Profits in Non-Price Predation,
ANTITRUST,Fall 2003, at 37; Pitofsky, supra note 18, at 216-17.
96. See also LePage's, Inc. v. 3M Co., 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003) (upholding jury verdict that
monopolist's use of bundled rebates violates§ 2 of the Sherman Act). Compare Image Technical Servs.,
9 I.
92.
93.
94.
95.
(2003);

Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding Kodak violated§ 2 by refusing to deal
with rival service providers), with In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litigs., 203 F.3d 1322 (Fed.Cir. 2000)
(holding owner of patents or copyrights has no duty to deal with rivals).
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conduct is unlawful if and only if the monopolist (1) is pricing below some accepted
measure of cost; and (2) has a plan to recoup short-run losses from sales below cost
through the long-run supracompetitive pricing, once shallow pocket rivals have been
eliminated. 97 However, no such consensus exists with respect to non-price exclusionary behavior, the issue at stake in Trinko.
The Court in Trinko began its analysis with the rule articulated in Colgate stating
"as a general matter, the Sherman Act 'does not restrict the long recognized right of
[a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise
his own independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. "' 98 The Court iri
Trinko, did not point out, as it might have, that even in Colgate, the "long recognized
right" not to deal is limited to those cases where the refusal to deal is carried out "[i]n
the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.' 199 Nevertheless, the
Court, reaffirming its decision in Aspen Skiing, did state that "[t]he high value that we
have placed on the right to refuse to deal with other firms does not mean the right is
unqualified." 100 Still, its embrace of Aspen Skiing was at best lukewarm because the
Court quickly described the Aspen Skiing holding as "at or near the outer boundary of
§ 2 liability.''' 0 '
As discussed above, 102 the Court found that Aspen Skiing did not apply on the
record before the Court and concluded that Verizon had not violated§ 2. 103 Yet, the
Court chose to pass on the task of articulating a bright-line rule for determining the
legality of non-price based exclusionary conduct by a monopolist. 104 Several such
bright-line standards have been proposed, including (I) the profit sacrifice test; (2) the
"but-for" test; (3) the "equally efficient rival" standard; (4) the disproportionality
standard; and (5) the balancing test. 105

a. The Profit Sacrifice Test
The profit sacrifice test is simply an extension of the predatory pricing standard
enunciated in Brooke Group' 06 to cases involving non-price predation. Under this
standard, a plaintiff must establish that defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct,

97. BrookeGroup Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,224 (1993). See Gavil,
supra note 95, at 14-15.
98. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,408 (2004)(citing
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)).
99. Colgate, 250 U.S. at 307.
100. Trinko, 540 U.S. at408 (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585,
601 (1985)).
IOI. Id. at 409.
102. See supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
103. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-411.
I 04. Nevertheless, some scholars are of the view that Trinko adopts a profit sacrifice test for all § 2
violations. See Marina Lao, Aspen Skiing and Trinko; Antitrust Intent and "Sacrifice, " 73 ANTITRUST
L.J. 171, 173 (2005). But see Eleanor M. Fox, Is There Life in Aspen After Trinko: The Silent Revolution
of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 153, 161 (2005) (the profit sacrifice test does not fit
the facts of Trinko because "there were no profits to be made from giving access to the rivals").
105. Gavil, supra note 95, at 52-65.
106. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993).
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giving up short-term profits, which would be recouped through the exercise of long108
term monopoly power. 107 While this test has support among academics, it has been
109
The Achilles heel of the profit
powerfully and convincingly criticized by others.
behavior to violate § 2, it
exclusionary
for
that
sacrifice test is its implicit assumption
must impose some cost on the monopolist and hence be unprofitable in the short-term.
This is manifestly not the case. For example, in monopoly maintenance cases, such as
Trinko, the alleged monopolist makes no profit sacrifice because the exclusionary acts
make the monopolist's conduct profitable at every point in time. 110 Moreover, some
non-price exclusionary practices, including exclusive dealing and tying arrangements,
111
At the same
exclude rivals at virtually no cost and may be profitable immediately.
conduct
condemning
by
positives
false
some
produce
may
test
sacrifice
profit
time, the
requires
and
that is not unlawful. For example, product innovation is typically costly
"sacrifice" of profits in the near term.112 If the new product is successful, then rivals
are exduded because consumers will have substituted the new product for the old. A
profit sacrifice test would not distinguish between competitive and anti-competitive
113
innovation and therefore would condemn virtually all innovation.

b. "No Economic Sense" Test
Under the "no economic sense" test, championed, at least initially, by the government in Trinko, exclusionary conduct is unlawful "if the conduct would not make
economic sense for the defendant but for its elimination or softening of competition. "114 Conversely, exclusionary conduct would be lawful if undertaken for legitimate business purposes. The "no economic sense" test would radically alter the focus
of monopolization inquiries away from the traditional examination to the nature of the
defendant's conduct toward the benefits, i.e., efficiencies resulting from the
monopolistic behavior. II5 In theory at least, a monopolist's conduct would be upheld
under this standard if any efficiency gains can be established without the necessity of

107. See Gavit, supra note 9S, at SS-S8.
108. See, e.g., Patterson, supra note 9S, at 37.
109. See Elhauge, supra note 9S, at 253; Hovenkamp, supra note 9S, at 147.
110. Gregory J. Werden, Panel Discussion at 7, Hitting the Antitrust "Refresh" Button/or In-House
Counsel Following Trinko, THE ANTITRUSTSOURCE,July 2004, http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/
sourceJuly04-Teleconf7=23.pdf.
111. See Hovenkamp, supra note 9S, at 1S3-S7.
112. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Identifying Exclusionary Conduct Under Section 2: The "No
L.J. 413-24 (2006) ("A short-term profit sacrifice obviously is
Economic Sense" Test, 73 ANTITRUST
insufficient to make conduct exclusionary because much procompetitive conduct entails the sacrifice of
current profit in pursuit of greater profit over the longer term."); R. Hewitt Pate, Testimony before the
Antitrust Modernization Commission Hearing Panel: Exclusionary Conduct: Refusals to Deal and
Bundling and Loyalty Discounts (Sept. 29, 200S) ("Businesses often surrender short-term profits for
investments that promise greater future profits, and they do so for reasons that make business sense
independent of any reduction in competition."); Gavit, supra, note 9S, at SS-S8; Elhauge, supra note 9S,
at 274-79.
113. Gavit, supra note 9S, at 3-S.
114. Brief for the United States and the Federal Trade Commission as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at IO, Trinka, S40 U.S. 398 (2004) (No. 02-682); see also Werden, supra note 110, at 7.
I IS. See Gavit, supra note 9S, at S2-S4.
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balancing those benefits against any anticompetitive effects. 116 For this reason, the "no
economic sense" standard has been viewed by critics as overly permissive. 117
Proponents, on the other hand, have mounted a vigorous defense of the "no economic
sense" standard. 118 While recognizing that the test "does not purport to condemn all
conduct that might create market power or reduce economic welfare," 119they argue that
in the "real world," judges and juries cannot accurately determine whether the
procompetitive aspects of business conduct outweigh the anticompetitive aspects. 120
The "no economic sense" test provides a standard that can be administered by the
courts without deterring procompetitive behaviors. 121

c. Equally Efficient Rival Standard
Judge Richard Posner has taken the view that conduct is unlawfully exclusionary
where it "is likely in the circumstances to exclude from the defendant's market an
equally or more efficient competitor." 122 Judge Posner's test works well in cases
involving price predation because it assures that a lower cost seller can charge lower
prices than its higher cost rivals without fear of antitrust sanction. 123 Outside the area
of predatory pricing, however, the Posner test is vulnerable to criticism. Professor
Hovenkamp points out that in certain circumstances the Posner definition of
exclusionary conduct "seems unreasonably lenient and even perverse. " 124 For example,

I 16. Id. at 52-53.
111. Id. at 53-55; see also Steven C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the
Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Standard, 13 ANTITRUSTL.J. 311, 354-46 (2006).
·
118. See Werden, supra note 112, at 413-33; Pate, supra note 112, at 8-12; A. Douglas Melamed,
Exclusionary Conduct Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, 20
BERKELEYTECH.L.J. 1247, 1256-67 (2005).
119. Melamed, supra note 118, at 1258.
120. Werden contends,
Economic analysis in the courtroom tends to be both incomplete and far from state of the
art, and more importantly, [the consumer welfare effects] test generally would be applied by
juries that do not understand economics and probably do not care much what it has to say.
Reliance on the jury system assures that the consumer welfare test would result in high
incidence of false positive findings of exclusionary conduct.
See Werden, supra note 112, at 432. R. Hewitt Pate also has stated:
But while the ["no economic sense"] test will lead to some false negatives, this criticism has
more purchase in the seminar room than in the real world. Because promotion of consumer
welfare is the goal of the antitrust laws, the perfect test in theory would of course be one that
consistently and accurately condemned all, but only, that conduct which leads to a net
decrease in economic welfare. No such test exists in the real world where businesses must
risk capital and make practical decisions. Although one can command a judge or jury to
consider all relevant circumstances and decide whether the pro-competitive aspects of
certain conduct outweigh the anti-competitive aspects of that conduct, this does not mean
that the judge or jury can do so accurately. In fact, there is no guarantee that people who do
this sort of thing for a living can do so accurately.
Pate, supra note 112, at 8-9 (footnotes omitted).
121. Werden, supra note 112, at 432-33.
122. RICHARDA. POSNER,ANTITRUSTLAW 194-95 (2d ed. 200 I).
123. Hovenkamp, surpa note 95, at 153-54.
124. Id. at 154.
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where a monopolist brings a baseless patent infringement claim against an equally
efficient rival in order to deter entry, that rival is likely to defend successfully on the
merits and hence would not be deterred from entry. 125 However, where that same suit
is brought against a less efficient rival whose ability to bear litigation costs is questionable, the monopolist may well be able to deter entry. 126 In this situation, the means to
exclude--the filing of a baseless infringement suit-is "socially useless," 127 and the
courts "should not condone useless conduct simply because a hypothetical equally
efficient rival would not be excluded." 128
Professor Gavil has also criticized the Posner formulation, noting the practical
difficulties of implementing an efficiency standard, given that measuring comparative
efficiencies is a "tricky business." 129 Professor Gavil further observes that the Posner
test is unfair to plaintiffs, who, at the pleadings stage, would typically lack information
sufficient to allege that they were "equally efficient" as the defendant. 130

d. Disproportionality
Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp have defined exclusionary conduct under § 2
as acts that:
(I) are reasonably capable of creating, enlarging or prolonging monopoly power by
impairing the opportunities of rivals; and (2) that either (2a) do not benefit consumers
at all, or (2b) are unnecessary for the particular consumer benefits that the acts
produce, or (2c) produce harms disproportionate to the resulting benefits. 131

This test is more in line with traditional monopolization analysis in that unlike the
"no economic sense" test outlined above, 132 the discussion begins with an examination
of defendant's market power and the anticompetitive effects of its conduct. 133 The
analysis then focuses on the effect of defendant's conduct on consumers. First, if the
conduct has no benefits for consumers, it can be summarily condemned. 134 Second, if
the anticompetitive conduct is not necessary to achieve the alleged consumer benefits,
the conduct can be similarly condemned. m Third, where the conduct causes harm that
is necessary to achieve benefits, the court must undertake a balancing process. 136
Disproportionality connotes not merely that the harm outweighs the good, but rather
that the harm outweighs the good significantly. 137 The precise mechanism for weighing

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at I 55.
Gavil, supra note 95, at 59.
Id. at 60.
Hovenkamp, supra note 95, at 148 (quoting PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 3
ANTITRUST LAW,I 651a, 72 (2d ed. 2002)).
132. See supra notes 114-121 and accompanying text.
133. Gavil, supra note 95, at 62.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
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is not clear, but it would appear that under a disproportionality standard, any doubts
would be resolved in favor of the monopolist. 138

e. Balancing-The Microsoft Approach
A fifth source of guidance for rules on exclusionary conduct comes from the D.C.
Circuit's opinion in Microsoft. 139 In that case, the court of appeals articulated an
~alytical framework applicable to all§ 2 cases: (a) the plaintiff must establish that the
monopolist engaged in conduct having an anticompetitive effect; (b) the plaintiff must
also establish antitrust injury, that is, harm to the competitive process and not simply
harm to a particular competitor; ( c) once plaintiffhas established anticompetitive effect
and antitrust injury, the monopolist may come forward with procompetitive justifications for its conduct; (d) if the monopolist fails to come forward with justification for
its acts, leaving the plaintiff's claims unrebutted, it is liable under § 2; (e) if the
monopolist asserts a procompetitive justification, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove
that, on balance, the anticompetitive effects of the conduct outweigh the
procompetitive benefits. 140
The balancing approach may be criticized for its uncertainty and lack of predictability; but proponents argue that unlike the simplified single-factored tests discussed
above, 141 "at least [the balancing test] takes all relevant factors into account." 142
Supporting the balancing approach, Professor Pitofsky argues that:
There are at least two other important reasons for preferring a balancing test over one
that focuses upon a single factor. Behavior that justifiably should be found to violate
the conduct element of Section 2 can vary across a broad range. I doubt that the very
same test should be applied to predatory pricing, vertical restrictions, or refusals to
deal, given the different prospects that such behavior would help or hurt consumers.
It seems likely to me that the test or tests that eventually are adopted will vary among
these different forms of behavior. A balancing test allows enforcement officials or
courts to take into account the respective weights of anticompetitive effects as
opposed to redeeming efficiencies. A second reason to prefer the balancing test is
that the other proposed tests-including the "no economic sense" or "profit sacrifice"
standard-focus on the impact upon the party engaging in the allegedly anticom143
petitive behavior. But antitrust is supposed to focus on the welfare of consumers.

Single factor tests, on the other hand, with their focus on the monopolist rather than on
consumer welfare and their implicit suggestion that courts are not up to the task of
balancing are a frontal attack on the rule of reason which historically has guided
analysis under the Sherman Act. 144

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 64-67 (O.C. Cir. 2001).
Id.
See, supra notes I 06-40 and accompanying text.
See Pitofsky Testimony, supra note 18, at 5.
Id.
Id. at S-6. In his testimony, Professor Pitofsky criticized single factor tests:
Finally, let me touch upon several of the reasons that have been advanced in favor of a
simplified or single factor test. Fint, it has been suggested that more lenient enforcement
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The "balancing" approach is less stringent for plaintiffs than the disproportionality
standard discussed above. Plaintiffs would have to show simply that anticompetitive
effects outweigh procompetitive benefits; whereas under the disproportionality
standard, plaintiffs would face the added burden of showing not only that the
anticompetitive harm outweighed the benefits, but also that the harm suffered was
disproportional to the efficiencies gained. 145
The question of when non-price exclusionary behavior by a monopolist is unlawful
is complex. The Court in Trinko chose not to articulate a bright-line rule. The closest
the Court in Trinko came to endorsing any test was in its discussion of Aspen Skiing
in which it stated that the defendant's termination of a voluntary, profitable arrangement suggested a willingness to trade short-term profits for long-term market price.
The Court stated: "The unilateral termination of a voluntary (and thus presumably
profitable) course of dealing suggested a willingness to forsake short-term profits to
achieve an anticompetitive end. Similarly, the defendant's unwillingness to renew the
ticket even if compensated at retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent. " 146
A fair reading of the Court's language is that profit sacrifice may be a sufficient
condition of non-price exclusionary behavior; nowhere does the court say that it is a
necessary condition. 147 In saying so little, the Court passed up a golden opportunity
to clarify the law relating to exclusionary behavior by a monopolist.
III.

THEMES OF TRINKO

The significance of Trinko lies not in its doctrinal pronouncements but rather in
its rhetoric. Justice Scalia·articulated what Professor Andrew Gavit has termed the
antitrust "counter-narrative" with respect to monopolization. 148 A counter-narrative as
the term implies, is a restatement of antitrust principles that is at odds with the
traditional antitrust narrative. 149 In the area of monopolization, the traditional antitrust
narrative cautions the courts to be vigilant in assessing the behavior of dominant
firms. 150 Indeed, courts have been suspicious of monopolistic behavior out of concern

under Section 2 makes sense (i.e., fewer false positives) because in the end monopoly prices
will invite new entry, and the innovation and other consumer advantages introduced by
monopolists will contribute to consumer welfare. I regard that as a direct challenge to the
fundamental insight of Section 2 which is that unreasonably exclusionary behavior by
monopolists undermines the incentives of the victim of the exclusion and often its ability
to compete on the merits, and may even undermine incentives of the monopolists to compete
in procompetitive ways. The point is fairly clear in the legislative history of Section 2 and
all but the most recent scholarship and case law. Another suggestion is that the balancing
approach is too complicated to be imposed by judges of limited competence. That is a
challenge to a broad range of antitrust enforcement including rule of reason balancing under
Section I and merger analysis under Section 7. Unless we are to move to a system where
there is nothing but per se legal and per se illegal categorizing. balancing efforts under some
form of rule of reason are unavoidable. Id. (footnotes omitted)
14S. Gavil, supra note 9S, at 61-64.
146. Trinko, S40 U.S. at 409.
147. See Gavil, supra note 9S, at 42-Sl.
148. Id. at 34.
149. Id.
ISO. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416,427 (2d Cir. 194S).
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that the exercise of uncabined economic power would chill the vigor of competition
and deaden initiatives to innovate, which in tum would lead to higher prices, lower
quality of goods, and less consumer choice.151 Justice Scalia's counter-narrative
contains three significant themes: ( 1) a more tolerant approach to the behavior of
dominant firms, (2) guerilla warfare on certain§ 2 doctrines, and (3) a minimalist role
·
for the courts in monopolization cases.

A. Tolerance of Monopolistic Behavior
The Court's counter-narrative espouses a kinder, gentler approach to monopolists
and monopolistic behavior. Traditional analysis in § 2 cases begins with an appraisal
of market structure and the conduct of the monopolist in the relevanl market. 152 The
counter-narrative focuses not on the anticompetitive effects flowing from the
153
Thus,
monopolist's conduct, but rather the benefits of the monopolist's behavior.
in Trinko, far from being suspicious of dominant firms,'the Court describes monopoly
154
power as "an important element of the free-market system." The Court further notes
that "(t]he opportunity to charge monopoly prices-at least for a short period-is what
attracts 'business acumen' in the first place." 155
Only after underscoring the benefits of monopoly does the Court consider
anticompetitive effects caused by the dominant firm's conduct. In assessing Verizon' s
alleged refusal to deal with AT&T, the Court notes the long-accepted general rule
under Colgate" 6 that a trader is free to choose its own customers. 157 The Court further
notes that forcing a monopolist to deal with a rival may create significant disincentives
158
Finally, the
for the monopolist to invest in "economically beneficial facilities. "
Court questions the ability of the Court system to administer forced sharing orders and
to remedy violations of such orders. 159 It also expresses concern that forced sharing
160
could foster collusion among rivals-''the supreme evil ofantitrust."
Under the counter-narrative, the monopolist is an upstanding citizen of the
community, not some shady character in need of constant surveillance.

B. Guerilla War on Section 2
A second theme of Trinka is the orchestration of guerilla war on three conductspecific doctrines of monopolization law: (1) essential facilities, (2) leveraging, and
(3) Aspen Skiing. The expansiveness of the Court's language in Trinko has rankled
antitrust scholars. Professor Eleanor Fox has taken the Court to task, stating that

151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
151.
158.
159.
160.

Id.
Id. at 424-25.
Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, UP, 540 U.S. 398,407 (2004).
Id.
Id.
250 U.s.300, 307 ( 1919).
Trinka, 540 U.S. at 408.
Id. at 407-08.
Id.
Id.
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"Trinko is a child in a china shop of Section 2.'' 161 She decries the Court's preference
for "business freedom" over "competition and competitive opportunity." 162 Professor
Fox also argues that Trinko talces dead aim at well-accepted principles of § 2
jurisprudence:.
[Trinko] overrules Berkey v. Kodak (monopoly leveraging is illegal) in a brief
footnote. For those who accept Judge Posner's interpretation of Aspen Skiing
(competitor's right of access to an essential facility), it overrules Aspen Skiing. For
those who accept the fllcts of Otter Tail (failure to supply wholesale power to
municipalities that hoped to serve Otter Tail's retail customers), it makes clear its
preference for Justice Stewart's dissent. 163

In a similar vein, Professor Thomas Kauper, former head of the Antitrust Division, has
questioned, "whether the 1974 complaint in the AT&T c·ase would be sustainable
under Trinko.'' 164
1. Essential Facilities

Under the essential facilities doctrine, a monopolist may be required to deal with
a rival where (l) forced dealing is feasible; (2) the product developed by the
monopolist is so superior that it is "essential" for rivals to have in order to compete;
(3) the monopolist has denied the rival use of the facility; and (4) the facility, as a
practical matter, cannot be duplicated by the rival. 165 Every court at the circuit level
has recognized this doctrine. 166 The Supreme Court has never had occasion to pass on
the essential facilities doctrine, 167 although it has on several occasions required
monopolists to deal with rivals. 168
In Trinko, the Court correctly stated that the essential facilities doctrine was not
an issue because the Telecommunications Act of 1996 mandated Verizon to grant
rivals access to its facilities. 169 The Court might have stopped there, but instead chose
to prolong its discussion by going out of its way to point out that it has never embraced
the essential facilities doctrine and by citing an article by Professor Areeda critical of
that doctrine. 170 At the very least, the opinion in Trinko raises doubt as to whether

161. Eleanor M. Fox, Walter J. Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation at N.Y. Univ. Sch. of Law,
The Trouble with Trinko, Address to the 52nd Annual ABA Antitrust Section Spring Meeting 4 (Mar. 31,
2004).
162. Id at 3.
163. Id at 4 (footnotes omitted).
164. Thomas E. Kauper, Section Two of the Sherman Act: The Search for Standards, 93 GEO.L.J. 1623,
1639-40 (2005).
165. MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 708 F.2d 1081, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); see generally
ABA SECTIONOF ANTITRUST LAW,2002 ANNUAL REVIEWOF ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS
62-63
(2003) [hereinafter ALD V).
166. Elhauge, supra note 95, at 261 n.20 (citing cases).
167. VerizonCommc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540U.S. 398,411 (2004)(citing
Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands SkiingCorp.,472 U.S. 585,611 n.44 (1985); AT&T Corp. v. Iowa
Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366,428 (1999)).
168. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (l992);AspenSkiing,
472 U.S. 585; Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
169. Trinka, 540 U.S. at 410-11.
170. Id. at 411.
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essential facilities provides a legal basis upon which to proceed against a monopolist,
independent ofa more general claim of monopolistic refusal to deal.
2. Leveraging

Leveraging is the use of monopoly power in one market to obtain monopoly power
in another market. 171 Leveraging as a basis ofliability under § 2 has been criticized by
lower courts. 172 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Griffith and again in Kodak has
recognized leveraging as a species of monopolization. In a footnote, the Court in
· Trinko gives leveraging the cruel back of the hand, suggesting that leveraging is not
173
a theory of antitrust liability independent of attempted monopolization under § 2.

3. Aspen Skiing
Aspen Skiing involved a joint venture gone awry. Plaintiff, operator of one skiing
facility in Aspen, brought an action under § 2 against defendant, who owned and
operated the other three ski facilities in Aspen. 174 For years the parties had cooperated
in issuing an all-area ski ticket, which permitted skiers to buy one ticket and ski at any
mountain in Aspen. 175 The arrangement worked well at first; but over time, defendant
demanded a larger and larger share of revenues until the arrangement was no longer
.
financially feasible for plaintiff. 176
177
Defendant then began marketing its own all-area pass to its three mountains.
Plaintiff then tried a variety of ways to re-create the four mountain pass and even
offered to pay defendant full retail price for access to its mountains under plaintiff's
all area pass; but defendant refused to cooperate. 178 Plaintiff then sued under § 2,
alleging a monopolistic refusal to deal. 179 The Supreme Court upheld plaintiff's claim,
concluding that by withdrawing from a long-standing and profitable joint marketing
arrangement, and thereby impairing its rival's ability to attract customers, defendant
180
In so ruling, the Court
reduced competition in Aspen skiing .over the long run.
identified four key factors that supported its condemnation of defendant's refusal to
deal under § 2 of the Sherman Act: (1) defendant had terminated a voluntary and
presumably profitable relationship, thereby giving up short term profits in order to
drive a rival from the field; (2) defendant had refused to deal with plaintiff, even at full
retail price; (3) defendant had proffered no legitimate business justification for its
conduct; and (4) as a result of defendant's acts, competition had been diminished
because consumer choice had been limited. 181

171. See ALDV, supra note 165, at 64; Kodak, 504 U.S. at482-83; United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S.
100, 108 (1948).
172. See, e.g. Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991).
173. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415, n.4.
174. 472 U.S. 472, 589-90 (1985).
175. Id.
176. Id. at 592.
177. Id at 593.
178. Id. at 593-94.
179. Id. at 595.
180. Id. 605-11.
181. Id.
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The Court in Trinko distinguished Aspen Skiing pointing out that (1) unlike the
defendant in Aspen Skiing, Verizon had not engaged in a voluntary course of dealing
with rivals; (2) but for the Telecommunications Act, Verizon would not have dealt with
rivals at all; (3) accordingly, unlike the case in Aspen Skiing, prior course of dealing
sheds no light on Verizon' s motives for not dealing with AT &T; (4) whereas defendant
in Aspen Skiing declined to sell to its rivals at retail, Verizon preferred to sell at retail
rather than selling to rivals at wholesale on a cost-based formula; and (5) while in
Aspen Skiing the product in question was already being sold by the defendant at retail
to the public, the services in question in Trinko were not available to the public. 182
Again, the Court could have stopped there without kicking dirt on the holding in
Aspen Skiing. However, the Court went on to isolate Aspen Skiing, describing its
holding as "at or near the outer boundary of§ 2 liability." 183 A fair reading of this
language is that cases like Aspen Skiing are rare and that its applicability should be
limited to its particular facts. This is good news for dominant firms that have been
repeatedly denied summary.judgment in refusal to deal cases on the grounds that, after
Aspen Skiing, whether there is a business justification for the refusal to deal is a
question of fact. 184
C. Redefined-And

More Limited-Role For The Courts

A third theme of Trinko is its advocacy of a more minimalist role for courts in
antitrust cases. As a threshold matter, the Court cautions that any antitrust intervention
by the judiciary must take account of the degree ofregulation in an industry. 185 The
greater the regulatory overlay, the less appropriate the use of antitrust interdiction. 186
The Court reasoned that in certain cases "'regulation significantly diminishes the
likelihood of major antitrust harm. "' 187 Specifically, the Court noted that Verizon had
been subject to pervasive oversight by state and federal regulators and that the
regulatory scheme was employed swiftly and effectively to rectify Verizon's breach of
sharing duties. 188
Accordingly, the Court viewed the benefits of antitrust intervention as "slight"
when weighed against a "realistic assessment of its costs." 189 First, the Court pointed
out the high costs of false positives. ' 90 It noted that even under the best of
circumstances, the application of monopolization law "can be difficult" 191 and that
mistaken inferences of anticompetitive effect "are especially costly, because they chill
the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect." 192 For example, Verizon' s

182. Trinl«,, 540 U.S. 398, 408-10 (2004). But for the Telecommunications Act, Verizon would not
have dealt with rivals at all. Id.
183. Id. at 409.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 412.
186. Id.
187. Id. (quoting Concord v. Boston Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 25 (1st Cir. 1990).
188. Id. at 411-13.
189. Id. at 414.
190. Id.
191. Id. (quoting United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 58 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
192. Id. (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. l.enith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574,594 (1986)).
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failure to provide prompt service to AT&T may have had no connection to any
attempted anticompetitive exclusion by Verizon. 193
Second, allegations of failure to comply with sharing requirements may be difficult
for an antitrust court to evaluate "not only because they are highly technical, but al~o
because they are likely to be extremely numerous, given the incessant, complex, and
194
Identifying the means of anticomconstantly changing interaction" of the parties.
195
petitive exclusion would prove a "daunting task" for"generalist" antitrust courts and
is better left to state and federal regulators.
Third, antitrust intervention in regulated fields would inevitably lead to costly
"interminable litigation." 196 Antitrust intervention is also likely to lead to duplicative
enforcement and liability. 197
Fourth, courts are ill-equipped to engage in the day-to-day supervision of the
implementation of "a highly detailed decree." 198 Again, that task is better left to
administrative agencies rather than the courts. 199
Fifth, even where a court finds that costs of enforcement do not outweigh the
benefits of antitrust intervention, the Court urges self-restraint, concluding that the
Sherman Act "does not give judges carte blanche to insist that a monopolist alter its
way of doing business whenever some other approach might yield greater competition. "200
Closely related to the concern about the high costs of antitrust intervention is the
concern about inherent limitations on federal judges in evaluating complicated
evidence and in supervising complex decrees. Simply put, the Court in Trinko suggests
that, at least in some cases, federal judges are simply not up to the task of evaluating
exclusionary conduct by dominant firms. The Court's language is reminiscent of
Justice Marshall's cautionary words in Topco over thirty years ago that in enacting the
antitrust laws, Congress did not intend to leave federal judges "free to ramble through
the wilds of economic theory. " 201 However, the view that courts are of limited utility
in evaluating complicated evidence soon gave way to an opposing, and now prevailing
view, as exemplified in Sylvania2°2 and Brunswick, 203 that economics can be a very
effective tool for informing antitrust decisions. Yet, to read the admonitions of the
Trinko Court, it is almost as if a generation of case law in which courts have
demonstrated an even stronger grasp of economic principles as well as sophistication
in their application, is being tossed aside.

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414-15.
Id.
Id. at 415-16.
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609-10, n.10 (1972).
Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-0-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
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IV. IS ANYONE LISTENING?THE LOWERCO~TS

[Vol. 59:1
POST-TRINKO

Trinko was only one of many cases which, following the passage of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, had been percolating through the courts ·and had
explored the relationship between that Act and the antitrust laws. 204 Not surprisingly,
all of the cases have looked to Trinko for guidance. What is surprising, however, is
that the lower courts have not been uniform in their application of Trinko principles;
and some antitrust claims, even.telecommunications cases with facts very similar-to
those in Trinko, have survived motions to dismiss or motions for summary judgment.
This is not to suggest that Trinko has not been beneficial to defendants. For
example; in Greco v. Verizon Communications, inc., 205 Judge Wood granted defendant's motion to dismiss in an opinion that is virtually a verbatim recapitulation of.
Trinko. Plaintiff had sought to purchase high-speed internet access, termed Digital
Subscriber Line (DSL) service, from Verizon but was denied because he purchased his
local phone service from a Verizon rival. 206 Verizon sold DSL as part ofa bundle of
services to its local phone service customers. 207 Plaintiff sued Verizon, alleging, inter .
alia, that Verizon's DSL policies constituted unlawful tying and monopolistic refusal
to deal. Verizon moved to dismiss. 208
In analyzing plaintiff's monopolization claim, Judge Wood opined that Trinko
required an examination of four factors: (I) whether the cost of antitrust intervention
outweighs the benefit; (2) whether the relief sought would require the courts to act as
"central planners"; (3) whether any decision would involve "continuing supervision of
a highly detailed decree"; and (4) whether a regulatory structure exists to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm. 209
As a threshold matter, the court found Trinko principles apply equally to cases
where the plaintiff is a customer rather than a competitor. 210 Turning to the merits, the
court found that in any efforts to determine the ~'but for" price, this court would have
to answer the same cost-related and market-force questions that the Trinko Court held
are not suitable for courts to answer. 211 The court further reasoned that the first three
Trinko factors point strongly towards dismissal. 212 The court's analysis of the Trinko
factors was:
( l) [T]he costs of antitrust intervention here would outweigh the benefits, because
intervention runs a substantial risk of skewing investment incentives: the constantly
changing competitive landscape makes it very difficult for a court to set a reasonable
price for services, which requires consideration of, inter a/ia, what return on
investment will maximize beneficial investment in new technologies;
(2) identifying and remedying the alleged wrongs here would require this Court to act
as a "central planner." In deciding whether Defendants are making DSL service

204. See, e.g .. Covad Comrnc'ns Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Covad
Comrnc'ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp. 374 F.3d 1044 (I Ith Cir. 2004).
205. 200S WL 6S9200 at• 1 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
206. Id.

201. Id
208. Id.
209. Id at *3.
210. Id.
211. Id. at *4.
212. Id. at *4-5.
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available to consumers on reasonable tenns and in time, what is the optimal
configuration of services and prices to promote competition, while incentivizing all
carriers to innovate;
(3) remediation here would require "continuing supervision of a highly detailed
decree." Continuing supervision would be needed for the Court to decide on an
ongoing basis, whether any change(s) in the competitive landscape change the
reasonableness of the tenns and conditions of sale the Court approved. The decree's
high level of detail would result, in part. from complexity of the accounting and other
pricing factors the Court would be required to consider. 213

Having disposed of the monopolization claim on the merits, the court held that in
any event, the plaintiff lacked standing to pursue that claim because the complicated
analysis of market forces that the court would have to undertake to determine any
damages left it "ill-suited to redress the alleged injuries." 214 The court further ruled
that for the same reasons, plaintiff lacked standing to assert his tying claim against the
defendant. 215
The Greco decision stands as a virtual carbon copy of Trinko. Although, unlike
the Supreme Court in Trinko, the court in Greco acknowledged the procedural
standards governing a motion to dismiss. 216 The Greco Court proceeded to disregard
those standards by assuming "facts" about the nature of the marketplace that were not
part of the record before the court. 217
Relying on Trinko, in MetroNet Services Corp. v. Qwest Corp., 218 the Ninth
Circuit upheld summary judgment dismissing a monopolization claim against a local
telephone exchange provider by a reseller of telecommunications services. 219 Qwest
offered volume discounts on phone services to businesses having more than twenty
phone lines. 220 MetroNet purchased Qwest services atthe discounted rate and resold
the services to businesses with fewer than twenty lines. 221 Because Qwest was losing
significant revenues to Metro Net and other resellers, it proceeded to change its pricing
structure and discount policies to eliminate resale of its services by arbitragers. 222
Metro Net then sued alleging (I) it had been denied access to an essential facility,
and (2) Qwest's change in pricing policies to eliminate arbitrage constituted unlawful
exclusionary conduct by a monopolist. 223 Relying on Trinko, the court made shortshrift of the essential facilities claim. 224 The court ruled that the indispensable element
of the essential facilities doctrine--lack of access to the facility in question--could not
be established because regulatory authorities in the state of Washington had power to

213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Id. (quoting Trinko, 540 U.S. 398,415 (2004)).
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id. at 2.
Id at 4-5.
383 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 1126.
Id. at 1127.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1126.
Id at 1128-30.
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compel access to Qwest facilities. 225 Plaintiff's real complaint was not denial of access,
but rather denial of access on its terms. 226 The court ruled that the essential facilities
doctrine does not guarantee access at the most profitable rate. 227
The court also ruled that Qwest's conduct was not unlawfully exclusionary under
Aspen Skiing. 228 Although acknowledging that Qwest had engaged in a course of
dealing with the plaintiff, the court, nevertheless, distinguished Aspen Skiing, finding
that unlike the defendant in Aspen Skiing, Qwest ( 1) was willing to, and did, sell at full
retail prices; (2) did not refuse to sell to MetroNet but would sell only on the same
terms as it sold to direct purchasing consumers; (3) did not forsake short-term profits
but rather tried to augment short-term profits; and (4) did not sacrifice profits in the
short run to exclude rivals in the long-run. 229
Finally, the court concluded that the existing regulatory structure adequately
protected consumers and that the cost of antitrust intervention in this case· would
significantly outweigh any benefits. 230 Accordingly, to extend § 2 protections in an
attempt to eliminate arbitrage would be contrary to the Trinko holding. 231
In New York Mercantile Exchange, Inc. v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 232 the
court dismissed a monopolization claim in a matter arising outside the telecommunications field. The New York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) sued Intercontinental
Exchange (ICE) for copyright and trademark infringement; and ICE counterclaimed
alleging monopolization; claiming denial of access to an essential facility and unlawful
exclusion under Aspen Skiing. 233
The nub of the essential facilities claim was that in order to conduct certain trading
activity ICE, a rival of NYMEX, needed access to settlement prices posted by
NYMEX. 234 Citing Trinko, the court rejected this claim out of hand because the
Commodities Futures Trading Commission, the regulatory body governing futures
trading, had the authority to compel access to NYMEX settlement prices. 235
The court also rejected the claim of monopolistic exclusion based on Aspen
Skiing, noting ( 1) the lack of any prior voluntary course of dealing between NYMEX
and ICE, and (2) the lack of any alleged harm to consumer interest as a result of
NYMEX's conduct. 236 The court also found that NYMEX had a legitimate business

225. Id. at 1129; see also Stein v. Pacific Bell, 172 F.App'x 192, 194 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding no
essential facility claim where access is mandated); Marco Island Cable, Inc. v. Comcast Cablevision, Inc.,
2006 WL 1814333, at •1, 8 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (holding that a company with a twenty percent share of the
cable market does not have monopolistic power over an essential facility).
226. MetroNet, 383 F.3d at 1129-30.
227. Id. at I 130.
228. Id. at 1134.
229. Id. at 1131-34; see also Dealer Computer Services, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co. 2006 WL 801033, at
•4-5 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 28, 2006) (in which the contract had expired, and no course of dealing had been
established); Abbott Laboratories v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D.Del. 2006) (stating that
there is no general duty to aid rivals).
230. MetroNet, 383 F.3d at I 134.
231. Id at 1137.
232. 323 F.Supp.2d 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
233. Id at 560-61.
234. Id. at 567-68.
235. Id. at 569.
236. Id. at 570-71.
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purpose in excluding ICE, viz., ICE's free riding on NYMEX's settlement prices. 237
Finally, the court, again relying on Trinko, found that ICE had failed to allege proof
ofa dangerous probability of successful monopolization of a second market and hence
rejected ICE's leveraging claim. 238
Other courts have been less expansive in construing Trinko. In Covad
Communications Co. v. Bell Atlantic Corp.,239 plaintiff was a rival to defendant in the
sale of DSL services and alleged, inter alia, that Bell Atlantic had violated § 2 by
refusing to sell DSL services to those customers who had orders for DSL services with
Covad in an effort "to prevent Covad from getting to the market ahead of Bell
Atlantic." 240 Defendant moved to dismiss on two grounds: first, Covad had failed to
allege that Bell Atlantic had incurred a short-term economic loss by instigating this
policy; and second, the practice was justified because it was unprofitable for Bell
Atlantic to sell DSL services to a customer that would soon switch to Covad. 241
The court rejected both arguments. It held that by alleging that Bell Atlantic's
conduct had been predatory, Covad had sufficiently alleged short-term profit sacrifice
in order to drive a rival from the field. 242 In addition, the court held that Bell Atlantic's
business justification defense raised factual issues not cognizable on a motion to
dismiss. In so holding, the court acknowledged that Bell Atlantic's conduct may
ultimately be found to have been a reasonable business decision. 243 However,
plaintiffs allegation that the conduct was unlawfully exclusionary was equally
plausible; and the factual dispute would have to be resolved at trial. 244
On the other hand, the court in Covad rejected the claim that Bell Atlantic's
alleged refusal to cooperate with Covad made out a§ 2 claim. 245 Relying on Trinko,
the court observed that there was no evidence of any course of dealing between the
parties nor any evidence that there would have been dealing absent statutory
compulsion. 246 Similarly, the court rejected Covad's allegations of a price squeeze,
i.e., that "Bell Atlantic charged Covad a prohibitively high and discriminating price for
access to its loops. " 247 The court found that there can be no liability for a price squeeze
if the monopolist was, as here, free not to deal in the first place. 248
The approach of the D.C. Circuit in Covad differs from the approach of the
Supreme Court in Trinko in two significant ways. First, in Covad, the court accepted
all allegations and reasonable inferences therefrom as true. Second, the court in Covad
refused to draw legal conclusions from a disputed factual record on a motion to
dismiss.

23 7. Id. at 571. In determining that there was a valid business justification, the court went beyond the
complaint and relied on statements made during oral argument. Id.
238. Id. at 572.
239. 398 F.3d 666 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
240. Id. at 675.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 676.
245. Id. at 663.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id.
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In contrast to the D.C. Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in Covad Communications Co.
v. Bel/South Corporation (Bel/South) rejected plaintiff's claim based on Aspen
Skiing. 249 The Bel/South Court ruled that "Trinko now effectively makes the unilateral
termination of a voluntary course of dealing a requirement for a valid refusal-to-deal
claim under Aspen. " 250 Because the Telecommunications Act mandated that BellSouth
allow Covad access to its facilities, the relationship between BellSouth and Covad was
not voluntary. 251 As there was no unavailability of access, the court also rejected
Covad' s essential facilities claim. 252
Nevertheless, the Eleventh Circuit refused to dismiss the complaint and upheld
Covad's price squeeze claim. Covad first alleged that:
If BellSouth had charged itself the same wholesale price for loops, BellSouth could
not make a profit from its DSL service at current prices .... BellSouth achieves the
unlawful price squeeze by allocating costs so as to apportion only a de minimis cost
to the loops over which it provides its own DSL service . . . . As the costs are
presently allocated, BellSouth must necessarily realize a significantly higher profit
margin on its wholesale sales (for which it faces no competition) than it does on the
corresponding retail sales (for which Covad is attempting to compete). BellSouth
intended this artificial cost allocation to harm Covad, and it did. 253

Secondly, Covad alleged that:
The wholesale prices BellSouth offers to ISPs for DSL service, as well as its retail
prices for combined DSL and Internet access service, are set so low relative to its
unbundled wholesale loop prices that Covad cannot meet BellSouth's wholesale or
retail prices and still make a reasonable return on its investment. lfCovad charged
retail DSUlnternet access customers the same price as BellSouth does, or charged
comparable wholesale DSL prices, Covad could not recover the cost of providing the
service, e.g., loop costs, collocation costs, transport costs, corporate overhead and
sales and market costs. 254

The Eleventh Circuit found that Covad's allegations ofBellSouth's below cost
pricing and BellSouth's probability ofrecoupment were sufficient to survive a motion
to dismiss on a price squeeze claim. 255 Upholding the complaint, the court observed
that "(t]hese allegations suggest that BellSouth is compensating for deliberately
reduced profits on the retail end of its operations with correspondingly greater profits
on the wholesale side, in order to stifle competition from firms such as Covad that are
both wholesale customers and retail rivals." 256
Similarly, deference to procedural posture was accorded the complaint by the
court in Z-Tel Communications, Inc. v. SBC Communications, Inc., 257 which upheld

249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

374 F.3d 1044, 1049 (11th Cir. 2004).

Id.
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Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1049-50.
1051 (alteration in original) (quoting CovadCompl. at W93-95).
1050-51 (quoting Covad Comp I. at '1192).
1050-51.
105 I.
331 F.Supp.2d 513 (E.D. Tex. 2004).
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plaintiff's refusal to deal allegations under Aspen Skiing. 258 Central to the court's
determination was its finding that defendant had voluntarily shared network facilities
prior to the enactment of the Telecommunications Act. 259
In addition, the court upheld plaintiff's leveraging claim. 260 In so ruling, the court
acknowledged an underlying tension between the holdings in Kodak! 61 and Spectrum
Sports162 but concluded that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged a dangerous probability
of success in monopolizing the second market to avoid dismissal under Trinko. 263 At
the same time, the court relied on Trinko to dismiss the essential facilities claim
because defendant was required by statute to grant access to its facilities. 264
In Creative Copier Services v. Xerox Corp., 265 a servicer of high volume copying
machines sued a copy machine manufacturer claiming violation of§ 2 of the Sherman
Act, alleging that Xerox had unlawfully excluded Creative Copier Services (CCS) from
the market for servicing high volume copier machines by refusing to sell spare parts
to CCS. 266 Although the court described CCS 's allegations as a claim that "Xerox had
'leveraged' its monopoly in the parts marketto gain a monopoly in the service market,"
the analysis focused on whether Xerox's alleged exclusionary conduct constituted an
illegal refusal to deal under Aspen Skiing. 267
The court ruled that CCS's allegations were sufficient to withstand a motion to
dismiss. 268 The court noted that CCS and Xerox had a prior course of dealing in spare
parts which Xerox ceased for no legitimate business purpose. 269 Specifically, CCS
alleged that Xerox chose to (I) delay shipping of parts; (2) make parts unavailable; (3)
raise prices on certain other parts; and (4) refuse to sell copiers to customers who
wished to use CCS as their service provider. 270 In so holding, the court specifically
rejected Xerox's argument that Trinko had imposed a short-term profit sacrifice test
in refusal to deal cases. 271 Nor did Trinko heighten the pleading standard in refusal to
deal cases. 272 In addition, the court specifically rejected Xerox's business justification
argument on the grounds that such argument was not appropriate at the motion to
dismiss stage. 273 Finally, Xerox's argument that it was free to deal with whomever it
pleased was rejected; the court ruled that a monopolistic refusal to deal, which stifles
or unnecessarily impairs competition, violates antitrust law. 274

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
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Id. at 538.
Id. at 536-37.
Id. at 542-43.
Eastman KodakCo. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447 (1993).
Z-Tel Communications, 331 F.Supp.2d at 542-43.
Id. at 539-40.
344 F.Supp.2d 858 (D.Conn. 2004).
Id. at 862-63.
Id. at 862.
Id. at 866.
Id.
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Id. at n.2.
Id.
Id. at 867.
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In A.l.B. Express, Inc. v. FedEx Corp., 275 the court similarly upheld a leveraging
claim. 276 Plaintiff A.LB. was engaged in the business of facilitating the shipment of
gems and jewelry. 277 A.LB. typically picked up shipments of diamonds or gems from
merchants and took them to FedEx offices for over night delivery to buyers. 278 A.LB.
used FedEx as its sole shipper. 279 Thereafter, FedEx began its own facilitation business
and solicited A.LB. customers but with little success. 28 FedEx terminated its pricing
agreement with A.LB., offering an alternative that A.LB. could not accept because,
inter alia, it would result in a seventy percent increase in A.LB. 's shipping rates. 281
A.LB. alleged that FedEx had unlawfully sought to leverage its power in the
overnight transportation market to monopolize the facilitation market. 282 With respect
to A.LB. 's leveraging claims, FedEx moved for judgment on the pleadings, and the
court denied the motion. 283 First, the court found that A.LB. had sufficiently alleged
the anticompetitive acts that are the sine qua non of a leveraging claim. 284 Recognizing
Trinko 's admonition that Aspen Skiing had limited application in refusal to deal cases,
the court found that A.LB. 's allegations of a prior voluntary and profitable course of
dealing between A.LB. and FedEx was sufficient to proceed under Aspen Skiing. 285
Second, the court emphasized that on a motion for judgment on the pleadings it was
obligated to accept the truth of all allegations in the complaint. 286

°

V. SYNTHESIS
The lower courts, post-Trinko, have separated the Supreme Court's rhetoric from
its doctrinal pronouncements. The courts in telecommunications cases, as well as cases
involving antitrust issues generally, have been cautious in deciding monopolization
issues.
1. In adjudicating motions to dismiss, the courts have generally accepted as true
all the allegations in plaintiffs' complaints and have dismissed only those claims where
it is clear that there is no set of facts that would allow recovery.
2. While recognizing that the rule of Aspen Skiing is of limited applicability,
courts have not rejected the doctrine as sui generis.
3. Nor have courts, despite the language of Trinko, rejected leveraging as a theory
of monopolization.

275. 358 F.Supp.2d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
276. Id. at 250-5 l.
277. Id. at 243.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. See id. at 244.
281. Id.
282. Id. at 250.
283. Id. at 243, 251.
284. Id. at 250-51; see also Applied Medical Resources Corp. v. Ethicon, Inc., 2006 WL 1381697, at
•5 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (permitting leveraging claim); but see Schor v. Abbott Laboratories, 457 F.3d 608,
610-14 (7th Cir. 2006) (rejecting monopoly leveraging theory).
285. A.I.B. Express, 358 F.Supp.2d at 250-51.
286. Id. at 251; see also Schor, 457 F.3d at 611 (holding that, on a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the court must assume truth of allegations in the complaint).
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4. There is unanimity that the essential facilities doctrine does not apply where a
seller is required by law or regulation to deal with rivals.
5. Courts, like the Court in Trinko, have resisted adoption of a bright-line rule in
non-price-based monopolistic refusals to deal.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Trinko, the Supreme Court missed a golden opportunity to clarify the law with
respect to non-price exclusionary behavior by a monopolist. In underscoring the
institutional limitations of the courts and the potential benefits of monopoly, the Trinko
decision suggests a more hands off approach to monopolization. That view has yet to
gain traction in the lower courts, and exclusionary acts by dominant firms continue to
receive close judicial scrutiny.
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